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1 Introduction
The fact that consumers display a high willingness to pay for quality should be a strong
driver for competitive firms to constantly improve quality. Yet, Sheshinski (1976) has
shown that the optimal quality selection by a monopolist rarely coincides with the
efficient one, although the direction in which it departs it is not always clear. In
oligopolistic industries, a large literature starting with Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
has shown the possibility of opting for a low quality when facing a high quality incum-
bent in order to relax market competition. Adding to this picture the fact that quality
is also desirable from a social point of view,1 we better understand the interventionism
of authorities, most often in the form of Minimum Quality Standards (MQS hereafter).
As nicely demonstrated by Ronnen (1991), the adequate selection of a MQS can
increase both quality and sales so that the industry welfare unambiguously increases.
The intuition for this positive result is quite simple: by constraining the low quality
firm to upgrade its quality, the MQS induces the high quality firm to select a higher
quality (in order to relax competition). In equilibrium, the price competition is however
fiercer so that prices are lower and more consumers end up participating. Crampes and
Hollander (1995) establish a qualitatively similar result with a different costs structure.
These two papers obviously make a case for MQS but their conclusions might be
challenged on several grounds. Firstly the issue of certification that inevitably goes
along with MQS,2 is neglected. In this respect, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that
certification does not go without inefficiencies: although certification intermediaries
tend to raise firms’ incentives to provide quality, they are likely to fail in avoiding
quality underprovision. Secondly, the MQS instrument exhibits several drawbacks.
Valletti (2000) shows that Ronnen (1991)’s mechanism is not robust to the mode of
competition. Scarpa (1998) shows that the welfare enhancing effect might critically
depend on the duopolistic structure of the industry. Maxwell (1998) puts MQS in a
dynamic perspective and shows that they decrease welfare in the long run because
they weaken incentives to innovate. Lutz et al. (2000) provide a model where firms
1It can generate positive externalities as in the case of food or avoid negative externalities as in
the case of pollution or the risk linked to foreign sources of energy.
2Regarding informational issues raised by quality provision in deregulated markets, we refer the
reader to Auriol (1998).
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may manipulate the selection of the MQS by the regulator in such a way that industry
welfare actually decrease. Glass (2001) reaches similar conclusions in a slightly different
setup. Interestingly enough, these cases against MQS are rooted in its most obvious
implication: a MQS undermines industry’s profitability. As a by-product, imposing a
MQS might induce the exit of some firms, or reduce entry, a problem also acknowledged
in Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995).3
Entry should be a particular concern in those industries which are currently subject
to massive deregulation programs. While it is expected that an enhanced competition
will ultimately materialize into lower consumers’ prices, it is also hoped that this will
not be detrimental to quality provision. Needless to say, the recent incidents in the US
electricity market or UK railways dramatically suggest that quality is a main concern.4
Building on the mixed appraisal of MQS reported above and, in particular, on the fact
that a MQS might conflict with the possibility of entry in deregulated markets, we
explore an alternative way to regulate quality, namely quantity regulation. We show in
a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that the regulator is best advised to limit the
output or capacity of the incumbent rather than impose a MQS in order to maximize
industry welfare.
More precisely, we consider a stage game where the regulator (government) can
either set a MQS or limit the output of the high quality incumbent firm. Then, the
potential entrant selects quality and bears some sunk cost to enter; lastly firms com-
pete in prices. Our (subgame perfect) equilibrium analysis reveals that in order to
maximize industry welfare, the government should most often prefer the quantitative
regulation over the MQS. The key feature of the quantitative restriction is to relax
price competition so strongly in the last stage, that quality differentiation becomes
purposeless. Accordingly, the entrant selects a high quality and because the entrant
ends up making more profits in equilibrium, entry remains compatible with quality
enhancement for a wider range of entry cost.
The particular form of regulation we consider here is clearly not pervasive in actual
3Notice that this mixed theoretical appraisal of MQS is to some extent confirmed by the (limited)
empirical evidence. See in particular Chipty and Witte (1997) for a detailed empirical study of the
effects of MQS on the quality of child care centers in the US.
4Evidences of the negative effect of deregulation in US airline markets on the service quality can
also be found in Rhoades and Waguespack (2000).
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markets. However, capacity limitation seems quite natural as a tool to invite entry
since it ensures the entrant of a protected (though limited) market share. Actually,
the current regulation framework in various European industries allows for such a
regulation. An example is the italian electricity market where a new law prohibits
any generation company from supplying more than one half of the national demand.
This measure was successfully taken to induce entry of competitors to challenge the
historical incumbent (former monopoly). A comparable provision can be found in the
European Regulation on Deregulation of Public Transport whereby the regulator may
choose to limit market coverage of an already dominant firm in order to allow for
enough competition. More precisely, Article 9 states that “A competent authority may
decide not to award public services contracts to any operator that already has or would,
as a consequence, have more than a quarter of the value of the relevant market...”5
Market coverage regulations also exist in traditionally private markets. For instance,
specific regulations regarding the maximal size and opening hours for supermarkets or
the ceiling on advertising revenues made by publicly owned television operators partly
obey to the same logic of guaranteeing sufficient room for competitiors. Needless to
say, quantitative regulation is a very old tradition in the area of commercial policy
where trade quotas are still common.6 There is thus a case where capacity limitation
may induce entry in deregulated market. In the present paper, we show that such poli-
cies also have very nice complementary properties regarding the regulation of quality
provision.
The literature on quality choice and regulation can be divided into two branches:
models that directly change the quality range available to firms and those which act
indirectly by altering firms’ payoffs at the market competition stage. The first stream
has been discussed above. Our effort belongs to the second stream; some previous works
are Cremer and Thisse (1994), (1999) and Kemnitz and Hemmasi (2003) who show how
taxation or price ceilings can improve average quality. In a trade context, Herguera
5Amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council on action by
member states concerning public service requirements and the award of public sector contracts in
passenger transport by rail, road and inland waterway, Official Journal of the European Commission,
C 151 E/146-183, Article 9-2.
6As will become clear in a few pages, our analysis owes much to the strategic trade analysis of
quotas, and in particular to Krishna (1989).
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et al. (2000) study the impact a quota on quality selection. However their analysis
is confined to a Cournot competition framework. To the best of our knowleddge, our
paper is the first to deal with the effect of quantitative restrictions on quality selection
under price competition.7
Our second contribution is related to this last observation. Indeed, our analysis
offers some original results regarding the outcomes of Bertrand-Edgeworth competi-
tion in markets with differentiated product. As is well-known, capacity constrained
price competition has been widely studied in markets with homogeneous goods after
the seminal paper of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). By contrast, very few positive
results exist for the case of differentiated goods.8 In this paper we offer additonals
characterization of firms’ payoffs for such games which complements the earlier results
of Krishna (1989) and Furth and Kovenock (1993). These results should prove useful
for further investigations on the nature of price competition in markets with capacity
constrained firms and differentiated products.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and charac-
terizes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the unregulated entry game. Section
3 characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entry game under a MQS reg-
ulation and derives the welfare maximizing level for the MQS. Section 4 performs a
similar analysis for the case of a quantity regulation. We then establish the superioty
of quantity regulation over MQS. Section 5 concludes.
2 Entry under “Laissez-Faire”
We consider a two-stage game between an entrant e and an incumbent i. The incumbent
is already committed to his quality si. In the first stage, the challenger decides whether
to enter or not, and in case of entry chooses her quality se paying a sunk cost F ≥ 0. In
the second stage, the two firms sell indivisible goods differentiated by their quality and
compete in prices. We study Subgame Perfect Equilibria of this game. The following
assumptions apply in the forthcoming analysis:
H 1 si = 1, Fi = 0, se ∈ [0, 1], Fe = F .
7 Boccard and Wauthy (2003) offers additional results in a model of horizontal differentiation.
8Noticeable exceptions are Krishna (1989), Furth and Kovenock (1993) and Cabral et al. (1998)
5
H 2 Firms produce at a constant marginal cost, normalized to 0.
H 3 There exists a continuum of consumers indexed by x. They are uniformly dis-
tributed in the [0, 1] interval with a unit density. The indirect utility derived by type x
when buying product j is given by u(x, j) = xsj − pj with j = i, e. Consumers have
unit demand and refraining from consuming yields a net utility normalized to 0.
The following remarks are in order. In H1, we assume that quality is not costly
for firms. Moreover, we assume that the incumbent is committed to the best available
quality. Accordingly, we focus on the cases where entry does not entail leapfrogging of
the incumbent. The implications of this assumptions will be discussed later. Notice
that we need to place an upper bound on the admissible qualities in order to ensure
that firms’ payoffs are bounded. It is possible to perform a similar analysis with a
more general convex quality cost without notably affecting the qualitative conclusions
of our analysis.9 H2 is standard in the relevant literature while H3 describes the usual
structure of consumers’ preferences in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen (1978). This
structure is retained in most papers dealing with MQS.
Using H1 and H3 we may characterize demands addressed to the firms as follows:
De(pe, pi) =

1− pe
se
if pe ≤ pi − 1 + se
pise−pe
se(1−se) if pi − 1 + se ≤ pe ≤ pise
0 if pe ≥ pise
(1)
Di(pe, pi) =

1− pi
1
if pi ≤ pese
1− pi−pe
1−se if
pe
se
≤ pi ≤ pe + 1− se
0 if pi ≥ pe + 1− se.
(2)
Firms’ profits at the last stage of the game are
Πe(pi, pe) = peDe(pi, pe) and Πi(pi, pe) = piDi(pi, pe)
The characterization of Nash equilibria in the pricing game is fairly straightforward.
Consequently, we limit ourselves to a informal (and mainly graphical argument). The
9We have performed the analysis with the function k(s) = s
2
K , with s ∈ [0, 1]. The computations
are available upon request from the authors. Notice that H1 can be viewed as the extreme form of
k(s) with K arbitrarily large.
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payoffs are continuous and give rise to continuous best response functions illustrated on
Figure 1. Notice in particular that the dotted area characterizes the prices constellation
for which both firms enjoy a positive demand. Accordingly, the firms’ best response,
denoted ψi(pe) and ψe(pi) exhibit kinks when they hit their relevant non-negativity
constraint. The unique price equilibrium is (p∗e, p
∗
i ) =
(
se(1−se)
4−se ,
2(1−se)
4−se
)
; it enables to
compute the first stage payoffs as function of the entrant’s quality se and derive the
optimal choice.
pe
pi
ψi(pe)
2
1
Monopoly i
Duopoly
1−se
2
*pe
Monopoly e
pe = pi−1+ se
pe = sepi
ψe(pi)
*pi 1−se
2
se
Figure 1: The price space
The subgame perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the “Laissez-Faire” game
described above is characterized by Choi and Shin (1992) and reproduced in Lemma
1. Straightforward computations show that the operating profit of the entrant is 1
48
in equilibrium; accordingly, entry will take place if only F ≤ 1
48
. The “Laissez-Faire”
analysis is summarized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose quality is not costly and the incumbent sells quality sh = 1, then
whenever F ≤ 1
48
, the entrant enters and optimally differentiates by selecting quality
4
7
. The price equilibrium of the continuation game is unique and in pure strategies.
3 Entry and Minimum Quality Standards
In this section, we add a preliminary stage to the game analyzed in the above section.
At this zero stage, the government can commit costlessly to a MQS, denoted z before
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the challenger decides to enter or not.10
Obviously, the MQS has to be lower than the best available quality i.e., we assume
z ≤ 1. Yet, for the MQS to be effective and alter equilibrium choices of the firms, it
must be sufficiently high. Using Lemma 1, we impose the further restriction z ≥ 4
7
. Re-
lying on the analysis of the “Laissez-Faire” game, we deduce that for an MQS z ∈ [4
7
, 1],
the best response for the entrant at the quality stage is to select the lowest admissible
quality level z. The resulting price equilibrium is then pze =
z(1−z)
4−z , p
z
i =
2(1−z)
4−z leading
to demands Dze =
1
4−z , D
z
i =
2
4−z and equilibrium profits Π
z
e =
z(1−z)
(4−z)2 ,Π
z
i =
4(1−z)
(4−z)2 .
We may then turn to the study of the optimal MQS to implement in order to max-
imize industry welfare. Neglecting the sunk entry cost, the industry welfare function
is defined as:
Wmqs(z) =
1∫
1−Dzi
(x− pzi )dx +
1−Dzi∫
1−Dze−Dzi
(zx− pze) dx + Πzi + Πze =
12− z − 2z2
2 (4− z)2 (3)
where the first two terms denote the surplus of consumers buying the high and low
quality product respectively. Straightforward computations indicate that this function
is increasing and concave in z. Notice that Wmqs(z) ranges from
3
8
to 1
2
over the range
[0; 1].
Incidentally, Wmqs(1) also defines the first best for this industry, when there are
no cost to entry. This result is quite intuitive. The first best corresponds to the case
where all consumers buy the best available quality at marginal cost (which is zero in the
present case). This is achieved if there are two firms in the market, competing in price
with an homogeneous product of top quality s = 1. Therefore, in order to implement
the first best with a MQS, the regulator must set z = 1. However, we obtain the first
best market outcome if only entry does take place. This obviously requires F = 0
for otherwise the entrant’s profit is strictly negative. Should entry not take place, we
would be left with a monopoly incumbent and a lower welfare level which is formally
equivalent to Wmqs(0) =
3
8
. This result illustrates the key weakness of a MQS. While
being quite effective in ensuring the selection of a high quality level by the entrant,
a MQS dramatically depresses profits. As a consequence, whenever there is an entry
cost that must be recouped by the entrant, this cost places an upper bound on the
10We refer the reader to Ronnen (1991) for a detailed analysis of this problem.
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available MQS. In other words, in the present model, the level of entry costs defines
the actual boundary faced by the government when regulating quality. Formally, we
may summarize the previous argument in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 For all F ∈ [0, 1
48
], there exists an optimal MQS z∗(F ) with ∂z
∗(F )
∂F
< 0 and
∂Wmqs(z∗(F ))
∂F
< 0.
Proof: The upper bound for the MQS is given by the level z∗(F ) for which an
entrant’s profit, net of the entry cost is zero. By solving Πze = F, we obtain as the
unique relevant root z∗(F ) = 1+8F+
√
1−48F
2(1+F )
which is a decreasing function of F in the
domain F ∈ [0, 1
48
]. Accordingly, total welfare is a decreasing function of the sunk cost
over [0, 1
48
]. 
Notice that whenever F ≥ 1
48
, welfare drops from 0.46 down to 3
8
' 0.38 since entry
is precluded.
4 Sales Restriction and Optimal Quality Provision
We now alter the above game by assuming that, instead of committing to a MQS, the
regulator is allowed to impose a quantitative constraint q on the incumbent firm before
entry takes place.11
4.1 Price Competition with a Quantitative Restraint
By definition, the sales quota q defines the largest demand level the incumbent is
allowed to serve. This restriction deeply alters the nature of competition in the pricing
game. Indeed, whenever prices are such that the demand Di(pi,pe) is greater than q,
the incumbent must turnDi(pi,pe)−q consumers away in order to comply with the sales
restriction. In other words, the incumbent rations consumers when demand addressed
to him exceeds the quota. The key implication of the sales restriction is thus to induce
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition at the pricing stage of the game. As is well-known,
11Such a sales’ restriction may actually be implemented by controling the incumbent’s production
capacity through the limited emission of construction permits or by editing new regulations.
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the organization of rationing in the market is a critical issue for such games.12 We shall
assume
H 4 Whenever Di(pi, pe) > q, rationed consumers are those who exhibit the lowest
willingness to pay for the good.
Notice that in our particular case H4 is formally equivalent to the standard efficient
rationing rule. We now turn to the analysis of the pricing subgames. Two classes of
Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing games have to be distinguished according to the quality
selected in the first stage:
• If se = 1, firms sell homogeneous products in the price game and one of them
faces a quantitative constraint. We shall refer to Levitan and Shubik (1972) for
a detailed analysis of the price equilibrium in these subgames.
• If se < 1, we have a Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game with product differen-
tiation. To the best of our knowledge, Krishna (1989) is the first paper which
provides a characterization for a price equilibrium in such games.13 We shall rely
on and extend her analysis in the following.
We start by analyzing subgames where products are differentiated (se < 1) and
then pass to the case of homogeneous products before concluding with the optimal
quality choice by the entrant.
4.2 Differentiated Products
Let us start with an informal discussion of the nature of equilibria in pricing games
where products are vertically differentiated. We may partition the price space according
to whether the constraint is binding or not. SolvingDi(pi,pe) = q for pe yields a function
β(pi) which defines two competition regimes. If pe < β(pi), the traditional Bertrand
analysis, as developed in section 2 applies while if pe ≥ β(pi), the constraint is binding.
Notice then that a consumer wishing to buy the high quality product but being
rationed by the incumbent always prefers to buy the low quality product of the entrant
12See Davidson and Deneckere (1986) for a classical analysis of this last issue.
13 Furth and Kovenock (1993) also provide some characterization of equilibrium payoffs in Bertrand-
Edgeworth games of product differentiation.
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instead of refraining from consuming. Thus, when at the prevailing prices the demand
addressed to the incumbent exceeds the quota q, all rationed consumers are recovered
by the entrant which faces a residual market 1− q. Therefore, within this domain, the
entrant’s payoff does not depend on pi. The optimal price, which we denote p
s
e is then
independent of the incumbent’s one and is referred to as the “security“ strategy.14 As
for the incumbent, sales are constant in this domain and equal to the quota q. Thus,
the optimal price is pi = β
−1(pe), the highest price for which the quota is binding.
The keypoint then is to note that the possibility of rationing breaks the concavity
of the entrant’s profit function whereas that of the incumbent’s remains concave in
the domain where its demand is positive. This will preclude the existence of pure
strategy equilibria in many pricing subgames. While the existence of mixed strategy
equilibria is not an issue here because of the continuity in payoffs, the characterization
of mixed strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth games with product differentiation
is to a large extent an open problem. To the best of our knowledge, Krishna (1989)
was the first paper providing a characterization of equilibrium in such a case. The
mixed strategy equilibrium she identifies can be used within our setup. It takes the
following form: the entrant will mix over two atoms (the security price and some lower
price) while the incumbent will play a pure strategy. However, in many subgames, this
equilibrium does not exist because a crucial non-negativity constraint is not satisfied
for the incumbent. While we do not characterize equilibria for such cases, we are able
to characterize the entrant’s equilibrium payoff.
The following lemma constitutes the technical contribution of this article to the
literature on Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with product differentiation.
Lemma 3 Assume se < si = 1, there exists a critical values for the quota, denoted
q¯(se) such that
I if q > q¯(se), the “Laissez-Faire” equilibrium prevails.
I if q ≤ q¯(se), there exists a mixed strategy equilibirum where the entrant obtains the
security payoff 1
4
se(1− q)2 in equilibrium.
Proof We proceed through four steps. Firstly, we derive firms’ best reponse. Sec-
ondly, we identify the range in which the ”Laissez-Faire” equilibrium applies. Thirdly,
14The term ”security” refers to the fact that this strategy yields the minimax payoff
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we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium where only the entrant firm mixes over
two atoms and characterize the associated payoffs. Finally, we show that the former
mixed strategies equilibrium does not exists for very tight quotas; in that case, we
prove that any equilibrium (involving non-degenerated mixed strategies for the two
firms) yields the security payoff to the entrant.
Step 1 The frontier between price constellations where the constraint is binding or
not is found by equating the incumbent’s demand Di(pe, pi) (the second line of (1))
with the sales quota q. We obtain pe = β(pi) ≡ pi−(1−q)(1−se). Firms sales’ functions
are therefore
Si(pe, pi) =
 Di(pe, pi) mboxifpe ≤ β(pi)q if pe > β(pi) (4)
and
Se(pe, pi) =
 De(pe, pi) if pe ≤ β(pi)1− q − pe
se
if pe > β(pi)
(5)
In the binding regime (second branch of the above equations), the incumbent faces
a constant demand. Accordingly, its profit is increasing in pi. Therefore, the best
response consists of choosing the maximal price which is by definition the frontier
price β−1(pe). Using the continuity of payoffs, we note that this price is itself weakly
dominated by the best response of the non binding regime. The latter is ψi(pe) =
pe+1−se
2
, whenever it is attainable. Solving ψi(pe) = β
−1(pe) yields p¯e ≡ (2q−1)(1−se).
The best response of the incumbent is therefore continuous with a kink at p¯e. Formally,
we obtain the best response15
φi(pe) =
 ψi(pe) if pe ≤ p¯eβ−1(pe) if pe ≥ p¯e (6)
The analysis is more involved for the entrant. The optimal behavior in the two
regimes are quite different. In the binding regime, the entrant acts as a monopoly over
a market of maximal size 1 − q. We therefore have pie = (1 − q − pese )pe. This payoff
15As can be seen on Figure 2, the β line crosses the frontier between duopoly and monopoly for the
incumbent at pi = 1− q and pe = se(1− q) = 2pse. As shown in the study of the entrant’s best reply,
pse is the highest price he might use in equilibrium, thus we need not worry for the exact shape of the
β curve above pi = 1− q.
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reaches a maximum of se(1−q)
2
4
at the security price pse ≡ (1−q)se2 . In the non binding
regime, the best response candidate is ψe(pi) =
pise
2
. After simplifications, we obtain
Πe (ψe(pi), pi) =
sep2i
4(1−se) which is increasing in pi. It then remains to choose between
those two candidate best responses by solving se(1−q)
2
4
=
sep2i
4(1−se) ⇔ pi = µ(q, se) ≡
(1− q)√1− se. Finally, we obtain the following best response correspondence:
φe(pi) =
 pse if pi ≤ µ(q, se)ψe(pi) if pi ≥ µ(q, se) (7)
Step 2 Notice that φe(.) is discontinuous, so that we cannot ensure the existence of
a pure strategy equilibrium. It can be checked, using equation (4) that the payoff of
firm i remains concave in the domain where sales are non-negative. Therefore, its best
response to any pure strategy by firm e is a pure strategy. Thus, the only candidate
for a pure strategy equilibrium is the “Laissez-Faire” equilibrium (p∗i , p
∗
e). For this
equilibrium to exist, it must be true that p∗i > µ(q, se)⇔ q > q¯(se) ≡ 1− 2
√
1−se
4−se .
pe
pi
µ
pe
s
p
i
*
pe*
pe
NNCBinding
1−q
2pe
s
Figure 2: The price space with quota
Step 3 Suppose q < q¯(se). As illustrated on Figure 2, there exists no equilibrium
in pure strategies. Since payoffs are continuous and the strategy space is compact, we
know that a mixed strategy equilibrium must exist. A natural candidate is the one
originally proposed by Krishna (1989). The incumbent plays the pure strategy µ(q, se)
and the entrant plays the pair pse and ψe (µ(q, se)). The entrant chooses the weights
over those two atoms so as to ensure that µ(q, se) is indeed a best response for firm i
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against the mixture. Notice that the entrant’s equilibrium profit can be computed with
any of the prices in the support of its strategy. Against the pure strategy µ(q, se), when
quoting the security price pse = se
(1−q)
2
, the entrant sells 1−q
2
thus its equilibrium profit
is Πe(q, se) ≡ se(1−q)24 . This equilibrium exists provided that Di (µ, ψe(µ)) > 0, i.e. the
non-negativity constraint (NNC) is not binding on Di(.). Solving this inequality for
q we obtain the restriction q ≥ q(se) ≡ 1− 2
√
1−s
2−s .
Step 4 Next, we show that for q < q(se), in every mixed strategy equilibrium, the
entrant earns se
4
(1− q)2.
In order to see this, consider Figure 3. It depicts a configuration where the non-
negativity constraint (NNC) is binding for the mixed strategy equilibrium candidate
identified in Step 3. Recall that the frontier between the binding and non-binding
quota regimes is identified with β(.). Best responses are drawn in bold face. Denote
Fi and Fe the firm’s mixed strategies in a Nash equilibrium.
pe
pi
pe
s
pe
(p
i
)β NNC
pi
2
se
µ αγ
~
~
Figure 3: Best responses in prices
Observe that by construction of the best response, the entrant’s profit is decreas-
ing in own price over [ se
2
, 1], hence the average over Fi is likewise decreasing over the
same range so that the support of Fe is included in [0,
se
2
]. For pe ∈ [0, se2 ], the incum-
bent’s profit is decreasing in own price over [α, 1], hence the average over Fe is likewise
decreasing over the same range so that the support of Fi is included in [0, α]. For
pi ∈ [0, α], the entrant’s profit is decreasing in own price over [pse, se2 ] (because he needs
not consider the area on the right of the NNC), hence the average over Fi is likewise
decreasing over the same range so that the support of Fe is included in [0, p
s
e]. By the
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same token the support of Fi is included in [0; γ].
Let p˜e ≤ pse be the supremum of Fe’s support. If p˜e < pse, the previous reasoning
applies again telling us that Πi is decreasing over [p˜i, γ] for every pe ∈ [0, p˜e], hence
the incumbent does not play prices above p˜i in equilibrium. Now recall that in a
mixed strategy equilibrium the payoff of a player can be computed at any of the prices
belonging to the support of his optimal strategy; let us then consider p˜e for the entrant.
For any pi ∈ [0, p˜i], the incumbent is constrained by the quota so that the entrant is a
monopoly over a market of size 1− q, hence her optimal behavior is to try to reach the
price pse. This stands in contradiction to the fact that p˜e is the highest optimal price.
We have thus proven that p˜e = p
s
e and as a consequence that the equilibrium payoff is
Πe(p˜e, Fi) =
se
4
(1− q)2 since pi ∈ [0, γ]. 
4.3 Homogeneous Products
We may now analyze the equilibrium in the second class of pricing subgames where
firms sell identical qualities (s = 1) at the pricing stage. In this case, the vertical
differentiation model degenerates into a standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly over
the demand D(p) = 1−p, but with a quantity constraint q for one firm. Recalling that
H4 amounts to assume efficient rationing in the market for an homogeneous good, we
notice that the corresponding game has been studied by Levitan and Shubik (1972).
Using their results and defining λ(q) ≡ 1−
√
q(2−q)
2
, we may directly state:
Lemma 4 In a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game where si = se = 1, firms play a
mixed strategy with common support [λ(q), 1−q
2
] and cumulative distributions Fe(p) =
1− λ(q)
p
and Fi(p) =
p(1−p)−λ(q)(λ(q)−1)
pq
.
The interested reader is referred to Levitan and Shubik (1972) and in particular their
appendix for a formal proof of this result. Observe that Fi (λ(q)) = 0, Fi
(
1−q
2
)
= 1,
Fe (λ(q)) = 0 and Fe
(
1−q
2
)
< 1, thus only the entrant has an atom at the upper price
1−q
2
. In this equilibrium, the incumbent’s profit is Πi(q) = qλ(q) (at the lowest price
he gets the whole demand 1 − λ(q) thus sells q because λ(q) < 1−q
2
< 1 − q implies
that his capacity constraint is binding) while the entrant earns Πe(q) =
(1−q)2
4
(at the
highest price she receives the residual demand 1−q). Notice last that this latter payoff
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is Πe(q, 1), the limit of the equilibrium payoff obtained in Lemma 3 when product
differentiation tends to 0.
4.4 Optimal Quality Choice for the Entrant
With the help of Lemma 3 and 4 we may now turn to the selection of the quality by
the entrant given the sales restriction q.
Lemma 5 The entrant selects se = 1 in a SPE whenever q < q
∗ ≡ 1− 1
2
√
3
and se =
4
7
otherwise.
Proof In the domain, q > q¯(se), where the “Laissez-Faire” equilibrium exists (see
Figure 4), the best response in quality is given by the “Laissez-Faire” candidate se =
4
7
(or se = q
−1(q) whenever 4
7
lies outside the relevant domain). Whenever, q ≤ q¯(se), the
price equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the entrant’s payoff is Πe(q, se) =
se(1−q)2
4
,
so that the best response is obviously the top quality; we refer to this as the “imitation”
strategy.
se
q
binding
regime
4
7
laisser-faire 
q*
Figure 4: The quota-quality space
In order to characterize the SPE as a function of the quota, we now have to compare
the profits under “Laissez-Faire” and “imitation”. Solving for Π∗e(
4
7
) = 1
48
= (1−q)
2
4
, the
imitation payoff, we obtain the cut-off quota q∗ ≡ 1− 1
2
√
3
' 71%. 
4.5 Optimal Sales Restriction for the Regulator
The previous analysis shows that if a government’s objective was simply to ensure the
provision of the best available quality by both firms, it would be sufficient to impose
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a sales restriction at a level q < q∗. Notice that this level does not look unreasonably
restrictive. It is actually larger than the equilibrium sales’ level of the incumbent in
the “Laissez-Faire” case (' 58%). It remains then to perform a welfare analysis in
order to identify the optimal quota. The intuition underlying the welfare comparison
is easy to grab. In the domain where the quota induces an optimal quality selection
of se = 1, increasing the level of the quota reduces industry profits. Indeed, the looser
the binding quota, the closer we are to the standard Bertrand equilibrium with zero
profits. In other words, a looser quota generates a fiercer competition at the price
stage and a greater consumer surplus. Computations show that the consumer surplus
gain dominates the industry profit loss. Accordingly, the optimal quota consists of
impositing the maximal sales restriction compatible with the selection of se = 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal Sales Restriction for the regulator is q∗ = 1− 1
2
√
3
.
Proof: For q ≤ q∗, we know from Lemma 5 that the entrant chooses the highest
quality and competition takes places in a market for an homogeneous good. In this
equilibrium the incumbent profit is Πi(q) = qλ(q) while the entrant obtains Πe(q) =
(1−q)2
4
.
The surplus of the consumer with type x ∈ [0, 1] is best understood by separating
2 cases:
• if x > 1− q, then x > pe because pe ≤ 1−q2 . The incumbent price pi is the lowest
with probability Fi(pe) in which case the consumer buys at the price pi (because
x > pe > pi and the incumbent is not constrained) so that we need to compute an
expectation. With complementary probability, the consumer buys at the entrant,
thus the surplus of consumer x is
H(x, pe) ≡ (x− pe) (1− Fi(pe)) +
pe∫
λ(q)
(x− pi)dFi(pi)
• if x < 1 − q, the consumer is rationed by the incumbent; then either x < pe so
that he does not buy at all, or x > pe and he buys from the entrant deriving a
surplus of x− pe.
Integrating with respect to the distribution of the entrant’s prices, we have three
cases according to the respective positions of x and the upper price limit:
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• if x < 1−q
2
, W (q, x) ≡
x∫
λ(q)
(x− pe)dFe(pe)
• if 1−q
2
< x < 1− q, W (q, x) ≡
1−q
2∫
λ(q)
(x− pe)dFe(pe) +
(
x− 1−q
2
) (
1− Fe
(
1−q
2
))
• if 1− q < x, W (q, x) ≡
1−q
2∫
λ(q)
H(x, pe)dFe(pe) +H
(
x, 1−q
2
) (
1− Fe
(
1−q
2
))
Integrating with respect to the uniform distribution of consumers over the range of
potential buyers i.e., x ≥ λ(q), we obtain the consumer surplus expression:
WC(q) ≡
1−q
2∫
λ(q)
W (q, x)dx+
1−q∫
1−q
2
W (q, x)dx +
1∫
1−q
W (q, x)dx = 1
8
+ q
4−3q+2
√
q(2−q)
8
(8)
which is an increasing and concave function. Observe that WC(1) =
1
2
, is the total
surplus at the outcome of Bertrand competition between two identical products where
no consumer refrains from buying, all consumers buy the best available quality and
firms capture no rent. The total surplus is
W (q) =WC(q) + Πi(q) + Πe(q) =
3
8
+ q
4− q − 2√q(2− q)
8
>
3 + q
8
This function is increasing and concave in q and defines a welfare level which is above
above the “Laissez-Faire” one, 3
8
, for any q. Accordingly, the Welfare is maximized at
q∗, the highest quota which is compatible with se = 1 in a SPE. 
4.6 Comparing Sales Restriction and MQS
We now come to our last result, the comparison of the respective merits of Sales
Restrictions and Minimum Quality Standards in our model of entry with sunk cost.
Notice from lemma 5 and proposition 1 that the entrant’s operating profits are exactly
equal to 1
48
at the optimal quota. Therefore, the presence of the entry cost F does
not constrain the government’s possibilities, as compared to Laissez-Faire and more
importantly, as compared to the case of a MQS policy. However, the quota may not
always dominate the MQS in terms of welfare because if F is very low, a very high
MQS is feasible and therefore dominates the Sales Restriction instrument. Formally,
we may state:
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Proposition 2 There exists a lower bound F such that when F > F, a sales restriction
induces a higher industry welfare than a minimum quality standard.
Proof The proof is only a matter of computations. By Lemma 2, we know that in
order to induce entry, the MQS is bounded above by z∗(F ), a decreasing function of
F . Now, since Wmqs(z) is increasing in z, the welfare at the limit, Wmqs(z
∗(F )), is a
decreasing function of the sunk cost F ; solving for equality with our Sales Restriction
candidate W (q∗), we obtain F ' 4. 765× 10−3. 
The economic intuition underlying this proposition is straightforward. A sales re-
striction relaxes price competition by inducing a less aggressive behaviour of the con-
strained firm. Recall then that in a vertically differentiated duopoly, one firm selects
a low quality in order to relax competition. However, in the presence of the sales
restriction this is no more necessary. The sales restriction is actually quite effective
at reducing competition. Accordingly, the entrant has no more incentive to down-
grade quality and both firms end up selecting a high quality. Moreover, because price
competition is less fierce, equilibrium profits for any quality pair tend to be larger.
There exists however a limit to the effective level of the quota. Should it be to loose,
the entrant would prefer to differentiate optimally rather than playing on the other’s
capacity limit. The mechanism at work may therefore be summarized as follows: the
quota alters the payoffs in the second stage in such a way that the entrant’s incentive
at the first stage are put in the ”right” direction, i.e. quality upgrades.
This mechanism should be constrasted with that underlying the MQS. The MQS
directly constrains the firms’ strategy space at the quality stage. By definition, in order
to be effective, the MQS must run against firms’ incentives. By leaving less room for
differentiation, the MQS undermines firms’ profits in equilibrium and therefore impedes
entry. As shown in Proposition 2, it is only when the entry costs are negligible that a
government should prefer the MQS to sales restrictions. In this case indeed, the fact
that operating profits sharply decrease because of a very high MQS is not a concern
anymore. By contrast, the residual market power that must be left to firms in order
to induce quality upgrades does not depend on F .
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5 Final Remarks
In vertically differentiated industries, MQS are often used to control for quality pro-
vision. Within a very simple model, we have shown that sales restrictions might be
more efficient than MQS. Our example is quite specific, although it should be stressed
that it is quite in line with the received literature on MQS. Several generalizations can
be contemplated. Notice that the introduction of positive quality costs that would be
sunk before price competition does not alter our conclusion. Obviously, we do not ex-
pect minimal differentiation anymore. However, average quality bought by consumers
increases and industry welfare increases as well. Similarly, our result are likely to re-
main valid if we do not impose any exogenous quality hierarchy between the entrant
and the incumbent.16 All in all, the qualitative mechanism that drives our result is
robust. It is the intrinsic nature of quantitative restraints to relax price competition. In
vertically differentiated industries, this almost immediately implies that firms do not
need to relax competition by differentiating products. Accordingly, average quality
may rise. Regarding quality selection, the chief merit of the sales restriction is thus
quite clear: it gives to all firms an incentive to select a high quality for its product.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If quality is not costly and the incumbent sells quality si = 1, then whenever F ≤ 148 , the
entrant enters and optimally differentiates by selecting quality 4
7
. The price equilibrium
of the continuation game is unique and in pure strategies.
Proof Recall that
De(pe, pi) =

1− pe
se
if pe ≤ pi − 1 + se
pise−pe
se(1−se) if pi − 1 + se ≤ pe ≤ pise
0 if pe ≥ pise
(9)
16See Boccard and Wauthy (1997) for a more detailed analysis.
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Di(pe, pi) =

1− pi if pi ≤ pese
1− pi−pe
1−se if
pe
se
≤ pi ≤ pe + 1− se
0 if pi ≥ pe + 1− se
(10)
and that profits are Πe(pi, pe) = peDe(pi, pe) and Πi(pi, pe) = piDi(pi, pe).
The solution to ∂Πe
∂ pe
= 0 over the range where both demands are non-negative is
ψe(pi) ≡ pise2 ≤ pise; thus, the low quality best response function is φe(pi) = ψe(pi).
In the incumbent monopoly region (pe > pise), the incumbent’s best response is the
monopoly price 1
2
which is feasible if and only if pe >
se
2
. Otherwise, Πi is strictly
increasing in the monopoly region and we always reach the duopoly region where
the profit is pi
[
1 − pi−pe
1−se
]
leading to a candidate best response ψi(pe) ≡ pe+1−se2 .
Whenever pe ≤ se(1−se)2−se then ψi(pe) ≤
pe
se
meaning that ψi is the best response, otherwise
it is the frontier price pe
se
which is optimal. As we have se(1−se)
2−se <
se
2
, the (kinked) best
response of firm h is
φi(pe) =

ψi(pe) if pe ≤ se(1−se)2−se
pe
se
if se(1−se)
2−se ≤ pe ≤ se2
1
2
if se
2
≤ pe
(11)
As one can see on Figure 1 in the text p.7, the Laissez-Faire equilibrium (p∗e, p
∗
i ) =(
se(1−se)
4−se ,
2(1−se)
4−se
)
is given by the intersection of ψe and ψi.
In the quality stage we have Πi (se) ≡ p∗iD∗i = 4(1−se)(4−se)2 and Πe (se) ≡ p
∗
eD
∗
e =
se(1−se)
(4−se)2 .
It is a matter of calculations to check that Πe reaches its maximum for se =
4
7
. 
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